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I. INTRODUCTION
Predatory pricing is a technique used by a firm to drive competitors
out of a market. Predatory pricing occurs when a predator firm with a
monopoly in another market lowers its prices so that other firms lose
business. Once the competition leaves the market, the firm can raise its
prices, resulting in a monopolistic, rather than a competitive, market sys-
tem. For example, a company with a monopoly in one regional market
might seek to monopolize an adjacent market by raising prices in the
monopolized market to support price cuts in the adjacent market.' Any
benefits to consumers from lower prices are only temporary. When com-
petitors in the adjacent market are driven out, the price-cutting firm will
absorb their business. The price-cutting firm eventually ends up with a
monopoly, and thus can raise prices above the level of fair competition.
In the United States, predatory pricing is prohibited by section 2 of
the Sherman Act2 and section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.' The current standard for predatory pricing in
the United States is based on an economic model which assumes that
pricing is based solely on efficiency concerns.4 Under this model, pricing
is predatory only when prices are below cost and when the firm can
recoup the losses after driving competitors out of the market. This stan-
dard as interpreted by the courts in the United States has made pursuit of
* B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1988.
1. Louis B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION:
ANrrrRUST 133 (6th ed. 1983).
2. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
4. Thomas G. Ehr, The European Commission's ECS/Akzo Standard for Predatory Pric-
ing in the FEC.: Deterrence or Disorder?, 17 GA. J. INT'L & CoM. L 271, 291-92 (1986).
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predatory pricing cases very difficult.5
The European Community (EC) is in the process of defining the
standards it will use in predatory pricing cases under article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome. 6 In the Akzo decision,7 the European Economic Com-
mission (Commission) explicitly ruled that article 86 does not require
any cost-based legal rule to determine when price-cutting becomes
abusive.
This Note describes how the standard for predatory pricing has
evolved in the United States, focusing on the leading case in the Ninth
Circuit8 and a recent decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. 9 The Note
also sets forth the standard for predatory pricing in the EC as articulated
inAkzo. Treatment of predatory pricing in the United States and the EC
is evaluated by a comparison of statutory language, underlying social val-
ues, and public policy concerns. Finally, the Note proposes that U.S.
courts adopt the EC standard for reviewing predatory pricing claims.
II. JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR PREDATORY PRICING
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Statutory Basis
Predatory pricing is an antitrust offense under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, which forbids monopolization and attempts to create monopo-
lies."o A monopoly occurs when there is only one significant seller in a
given market. The monopolist seller restricts output and raises prices,
thereby promoting inefficient resource allocation. Allocative inefficiency
harms society and prompts the creation of laws favoring competition.
Economists argue that an economy based on competitive markets allows
consumers to satisfy their preferences and thus promotes consumer
welfare. 
11
Price discrimination, another form of predatory pricing, is also for-
5. Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsu-
shita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1052, 1052 (1986).
6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]
art. 86.
7. Commission Decision 85/609, 1985 O.J. (L 374) 1.
8. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th
Cir. 1981).
9. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
10. Section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act provides that: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony...." 15 U.S.C. § 2.
11. SCHWARTZ, supra note I, at 42.
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bidden by the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936.12 Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges different rates
to different buyers for similar goods in order to eliminate competition.13
The Robinson-Patman Act has been construed to prohibit both primary
and secondary line discrimination. 4 Primary line discrimination exists
when the discriminating seller's price cuts harm her competitors."
When the discriminating seller's price cuts harm competition on the
buyer's level, the discrimination affects secondary line competition.' 6
There are differences in predatory pricing theory under the Sherman
Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. Under the Sherman Act, a court
will determine whether the predator firm has monopolized or attempted
to monopolize a defined market. 7 This approach emphasizes structural
competitiveness.'" Under the Robinson-Patman Act, by contrast, a
court will focus on unfairness and determine whether the seller's price
discrimination has injured competition at the seller's level. 19 Despite
these different emphases, both statutes prohibit predatory pricing and
promote the establishment of competitive markets in the long-run by
protecting new entrants and existing smaller firms.2"
Both the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act require the
plaintiff to establish the elements of predatory pricing.2" The plaintiff
must prove the monopolistic power of the predator firm which serves
several geographic or related product markets2 and show a pricing dif-
ferential between the predator's "monopoly" market and the competitive
market.3 To be actionable, the differential must reveal that the
predator's sales are below average total cost in the competitive market
and that these sales have resulted in injury to or exclusion of smaller
competitors or new entrants.24 Some courts also look to the intent of the
predator firm to exclude or discipline rivals. 5
12. 15 U.S.C. § 13.




17. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
18. Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theo-
ries and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L REv. 738, 766 (1981).
19. Id at 766 n.82.
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B. The Pre-1975 Standard
Case law has largely determined the interpretation of the elements
of predatory pricing. Prior to 1975, the courts adopted a two factor anal-
ysis to decide predatory pricing cases: (1) the unfair use of pricing
power against new entrants or smaller firms; and (2) the protection of
long-run market competitiveness viewed primarily in terms of market
structure.26 The courts did not articulate economic efficiency as a legal
policy goal.27
C. Post-1975 Standard: The Areeda-Turner Model
In 1975 Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner of Harvard
University published a very influential article describing their economic
model for determining predatory pricing." By late April 1986, the
Areeda and Turner article had been cited in fifty-nine decisions of the
federal courts and a number of important Federal Trade Commission
decisions.29 Moreover, many courts initially adopted Areeda and Tur-
ner's marginal cost pricing theory.30
Areeda and Turner departed from then-prevailing approaches to
predatory pricing by relying on a non-linear, rather than linear, cost
model.31 The linear model is based upon constant marginal costs and no
fixed costs. It thereby assumes that marginal costs equal average costs
32
and allows a court to determine whether a price is above or below cost.33
Because it is simpler than a non-linear model, the linear model is thought
by some commentators to be "the preferable model for the analysis of
cost-based legal rules."34
Areeda and Turner believe that more complex cost functions are
necessary to understand predatory pricing and that the non-linear model
is more appropriate.35
The Areeda-Turner model is based upon short-run production costs
26. Id. at 765.
27. Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1055.
28. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
29. Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1053 n.12.
30. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 767-68.
31. Id. at 748.
32. Id. at 743. Marginal cost is defined as the increase in price per unit increase in output.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id at 746. In contrast to the linear model, the non-linear model assumes fixed costs
and non-constant marginal costs.
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of the firm viewed at a single moment in time.36 Under this approach,
the marginal cost3" is the correct standard for efficient pricing.38 If the
predator firm's price equals or falls below marginal cost, it will exclude
new entrants39 who cannot produce at an output level that yields average
costs as low as the dominant firm. Although this price will eliminate an
inefficient rival,4 it will not eliminate an equally efficient competitor.
Since marginal cost is very difficult to calculate, Areeda and Turner sub-
stitute average variable cost.4
The courts rely on two premises which are derived from the Areeda-
Turner model. First, pricing above marginal cost is lawful. Second, pric-
ing below marginal cost is presumed conclusively to be unlawful, except
under conditions of strong demand, when the price may fall moderately
below marginal cost as long as it remains above average total cost.42
The permissive pricing rule of the Areeda-Turner model reflects
Areeda and Turner's belief that predatory pricing is a rare phenomenon.
The rule is designed to discourage frequent predatory pricing litigation,
and thereby encourage socially desirable pricing conduct.43 Without the
Areeda-Turner model to define predation, risk-averse firms might avoid
lawful price reductions.'
Contrary to what Areeda and Turner intended, there have been nu-
merous cases alleging predatory pricing since the introduction of the
Areeda-Turner model.45 In deciding these cases, federal courts have
adopted three variations of the Areeda-Turner approach.' First, some
courts directly adopted the marginal cost standard advocated by Areeda
and Turner. 7 Second, courts have used an augmented marginal cost
standard, which dictates that pricing below marginal cost is unlawful.48
Under this standard, pricing above marginal cost is also unlawful when
36. Id. at 751.
37. Id at 743.
38. Id at 751.
39. Id
40. Id at 749.
41. Id at 752.
42. See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrausT LAW r 711d (1978).
43. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 753.
44. Id at 753-54.
45. Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1052.
46. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 767-768.
47. See Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 491 F. Supp.
1199, 1221-22 (D. Haw. 1980); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847, 853-56
(N.D. Cal. 1978).
48. See Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co., 633 F.2d 1362, 1365-67 (9th Cir.
1980); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
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high barriers to entry exist or when other elements demonstrate preda-
tory pricing.49 Such elements include intent, limit pricing, non-price pre-
dation, and entry barriers.50 Third, courts have looked to average total
cost to decide predation. 1 Under this standard, courts find that pricing
below average total cost is unlawful when, in light of all facts, the price is
unreasonable or predatory. 2
D. Analysis of the Areeda-Turner Model
In recent years, economists have criticized the Areeda-Turner
model and courts have begun to recognize the difficulties of employing it
in complex litigation. 3 This section discusses the principal criticisms of
the model and offers a possible alternative.
1. Criticisms of the Areeda-Turner Model
The Areeda-Turner model has been criticized for its use of average
variable cost (AVC) as a substitute for marginal cost (MC). Areeda and
Turner use AVC as a substitute for marginal cost because it makes estab-
lishment of the elements of a predatory pricing claim easier.54 The sub-
stitution of AVC for MC is problematic because no constant relationship
exists between them.55 In fact, MC can be greater than, equal to, or less
than AVC depending on the level of output.56 MC is high when produc-
tion begins, decreases as the plant nears capacity, and then rises as the
plant begins to strain past its capacity. The strain created at higher
output levels forces MC to rise significantly above AVC.' 8
Critics believe that since AVC is not an accurate substitute for MC
and does not reveal the correct pricing floor, AVC alone should not be
used to determine legitimate pricing practices. Instead, the relationships
between price and cost at any current level of output should be examined
in order to determine the appropriate pricing floor. At low levels of out-
put, AVC is the lowest cost below which the price cannot drop and is
49. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir,
1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
50. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 769.
51. See Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., Trade Cas, (CCH)
63,947 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 1981).
52. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 769-70.
53. Id. at 768.
54. Id. at 751.
55. Id. at 752.
56. Id.




used as the judicial standard because it is acceptably close to MC.59 At
moderate levels, MC rises significantly above AVC, and thus MC should
be used as the pricing floor.' As output increases over the moderate
range, AVC should be the pricing floor because it approximates MC.61
Finally, as output continues to increase, MC again must serve as the pric-
ing floor.62
The calculation of AVC gives rise to several problems. The Areeda-
Turner model does not reflect the differences between AVC and MC.
AVC does not include long-term costs and thus is underinclusive.63
Areeda and Turner attempt to compensate by including in their defini-
tion of average variable cost components not normally defined as variable
costs.6 For example, the Areeda-Turner model includes all advertising
and promotional expenses as short-run costs, even though these expenses
are long-run in nature.65
Another problem with the use of AVC is that it can easily be dis-
torted. AVC is subject to distortion because the marginal cost/average
variable cost test is affected by variances in the ratio of fixed to variable
cost.6 6 Firms can influence the marginal cost figure by manipulating the
classification of costs as either fixed or variable and thereby calculating
average variable cost in different waysY.6 Thus, firms with identical costs
could have different AVCs and thereby distort the model.
68
2. Predatory Pricing Which Does Not Violate the Areeda-
Turner Model
Professor Oliver E. Williamson of the University of Pennsylvania
points out that the Areeda-Turner model gives a dominant firm with ex-
cess capacity flexibility to achieve predatory purposes without violating
the dictates of the Areeda-Turner model.69 Williamson argues that the
rule encourages a firm to deliberately choose a plant size that is larger





63. Id at 754.
64. Id
65. Id at 754 n.41.
66. Id at 754.
67. Id
68. Id at 754-55.
69. Id at 762-63.
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put and then to operate that plant at less than full capacity.7" To the
extent this occurs, the dominant firm's present output is less than its
most efficient level.71 At this relatively low output level, the dominant
firm's marginal cost is far below its average total cost.
72
Under these conditions, a marginal cost pricing rule provides the
dominant firm with a substantial range over which it may expand output
and reduce price below average cost.73 Thus, its permissible price is be-
low the costs of an equally efficient entrant. A potential entrant, recog-
nizing the dominant firm's position, is deterred from entering the
market.74
Professor F.M. Scherer of Northwestern University views limit pric-
ing as another way in which a dominant firm can deter entrants without
violating the Areeda-Turner model.75 A dominant firm using this strat-
egy will, before the new entrant enters the market, set its output at a level
so high that the market can accommodate the entrant's additional output
only at a price below the entrant's average cost.76 The potential entrant,
foreseeing these repercussions, is deterred from entering the market even
though the pre-entry price is always above the dominant firm's costs.
77
3. Predatory Behavior Not Detected by the Areeda-Turner
Model
The critics of the Areeda-Turner model contend that a short-run
marginal cost pricing rule disregards strategic behavior over time." a
These critics favor enlarging the legal definition of predatory pricing to
include predatory behavior.79
They argue that predation is essentially a form of communication
aimed at convincing prospective entrants that they will not recoup their
costs and earn a positive return. 0 Predation is economically undesirable
when it excludes from the market any firm that would make a positive
contribution to allocative efficiency, measured over the long-run.8' Thus,
70. Id. at 758.
71. Id. at 759.
72. Id at 762.
73. Id at 759.
74. Id. at 760.
75. Id. at 755.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 754.
79. Id




a short-run marginal cost pricing rule may not effectively bar predatory
behavior that reduces long-term economic efficiency.82 Critics of the
Areeda-Turner model conclude that an effective predatory pricing policy
must include strategic factors and assess legal rules in terms of long-run
effects.
83
At least two types of predatory behavior which are not accounted
for by the Areeda-Turner model have been identified. First, economists
have found a predatory effect from strategic behavior based on reputa-
tion." They argue that costly investment in reputation-building proves
profitable in the long-run if it eliminates or disciplines an existing rival
and deters, scares, or disciplines potential entrants."5 Perceiving the
tough tactics of the existing firm, a potential entrant is likely to choose to
avoid a fight over market share and, therefore, not enter the market.
8 6
Second, signaling has been defined as predatory behavior. By falsely
signaling rivals that the predator has a low cost base, below cost pricing
can prompt existing rivals to exit the market and deter potential rivals
from entering, by causing them to believe that they are less efficient and
cannot compete with the predator.87 Thus, analysis of predation through
behavioral strategies moves beyond the popular economic model to pro-
vide a comprehensive view of all forms of predation.
4. Scherer's Alternative to the Areeda-Turner Model
Professor Scherer points out the deficiencies in all mechanical stan-
dards for predation and argues that the only viable rule for predatory
pricing is a rule of reason inquiry into all relevant variables.88 He rejects
the more limited Areeda-Turner model because applying it to large-scale
competitors produces perverse effects.8 9 The marginal cost rule allows a
dominant firm to preclude entry by setting pre-entry output at such high
levels that the additional post-entry output forces prices below costY°9
In addition, Scherer argues that a rigid marginal cost pricing rule
will force a dominant firm to reduce output following a rival's entry.91
82. Id
83. Id
84. Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, Proving Predation after Monfort and Matsu.
shita: What the "New Learning" has to Offer, 1 ANTrrRusT 5, 6-8 (1990).
85. Id at 6.
86. Id at 6-7.
87. Id at 7.
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This, in turn, would discourage beneficial pre-entry output expansions, as
well as predatory price reductions by dominant firms.92
Scherer sets forth an alternative analysis of predatory pricing. He
proposes a thorough examination of the factual circumstances, particu-
larly the firm's intent and the structural consequences of the alleged
predatory behavior.93 The relevant variables should include: the relative
cost positions of the monopolist and fringe firms; the scale of entry re-
quired to secure minimum costs; whether fringe firms are driven out en-
tirely or merely suppressed; whether the monopolist expands its output
to replace the output of excluded rivals or restricts supply again when the
rivals withdraw; and whether any long-run compensatory expansion by
the monopolist entails investment in scale economy-embodying new
plants.
94
While Scherer's approach does not offer a perfect alternative to the
Areeda-Turner model, it does recognize the feasibility of predatory pric-
ing analysis which accounts for the anti-competitive results of strategic
behavior over time. Scherer's rule of reason approach may seem difficult
to apply. However, courts have used rule of reason analysis in antitrust
cases for a very long time.95 In the area of predatory pricing, such an
approach is necessary to prevent the courts from interpreting the
Areeda-Turner model to mean that predatory pricing is economically
unfeasible.
E. Ninth Circuit Approach: Augmented Marginal Costs Standard
The Ninth Circuit has expanded upon the Areeda-Turner model by
incorporating proof of subjective intent into its analysis. The Ninth Cir-
cuit thereby avoids dismissing claims against defendants who can manip-
ulate cost and prices to meet the requirements of the Areeda-Turner
model. In the leading case, William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT
Continental Baking Co.,96 the Ninth Circuit created a test which com-
bines cost-based and intent-based evidence to determine whether preda-
tory pricing exists.97
Inglis, a privately-owned bakery, competed directly in the northern
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 764-65 (citing F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Com-
ment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890 (1976)).
95. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 13.
96. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th
Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has decided a total of thirteen predation cases since 1975.
Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1077-94.
97. Ehr, supra note 4, at 295.
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California, private label bread market with ITT, one of the larger nation-
wide wholesale bakeries.9" Inglis claimed ITT used a systematic scheme
of predatory pricing to eliminate independent private wholesalers. 9 Ing-
lis produced evidence that IT had gradually reduced its prices over a
period of several years,'00 and claimed that this policy caused both ITT
and Inglis to incur substantial losses.' The policy ultimately drove Ing-
lis out of business. 10 2 Inglis also presented evidence that ITT had made
competing offers to Inglis's customers, forcing Inglis to lower its own
prices.' 013 Furthermore, Inglis offered evidence that the ITT scheme was
designed to eliminate Inglis from the market."°
The Ninth Circuit determined that the question to be decided in
predatory pricing cases was whether the plaintiff was a casualty of vigor-
ous, but honest, competition, or the victim of unfair and predatory tac-
tics adopted by a company intent on monopolizing the market. 0 5 To
decide this question, the court relied on cost-based information. It stated
that: "Prices below the average total cost, but above the average variable
cost, may represent a legitimate means of minimizing losses during [a]
period of inadequate demand."'" °
The court declared it would focus on what a rational firm would
expect its prices to accomplish. 7 The court did not require all plaintiffs
to produce evidence of the defendant's actual intent. 08 Rather, preda-
tory pricing could be proven by a cost and price analysis. However, the
evidence of costs and pricing practices had to demonstrate that the de-
fendant anticipated its low prices could have a destructive effect upon
competition and would thus enhance its market position0'°9
The court put forth the following test for determining when preda-
tory pricing exists:
[T]o establish predatory pricing a plaintiff must prove that the antici-
pated benefits of a defendant's price depended on its tendency to disci-
pline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm's long-
term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power. If the defendant's
98. William Inglis & Sons BakIng Co., 668 F.2d at 1024.
99. Id
100. Id at 1025.
101. Id
102. Id at 1026.
103. Id at 1025.
104. Id
105. Id at 1026.
106. Id at 1035.
107. Id
108. Id at 1034.
109. Id at 1035.
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prices were below average total cost but above average variable cost,
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing defendant's pricing was pred-
atory. If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were
below average variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case of predatory pricing and the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove that the prices were justified without regard to any anticipated
destructive effect they might have on competitors.'
10
One year after deciding Inglis, the Ninth Circuit again addressed
predatory pricing in Transamerica Computer v. IBM Corp."' In that
decision, the court again refused to rely solely on cost-based analysis,
saying, "[a] rule based exclusively on cost forecloses consideration of
other important factors, such as intent, market power, market structure,
and long-run behavior in evaluating the predatory impact of a pricing
decision." '112 The court concluded that even prices set above average to-
tal cost might have predatory connotations. In such a case, the plaintiff
would have to prove predation by clear and convincing evidence.
113
Based upon the decisions in Inglis and Transamerica Computer, the
Ninth Circuit has adopted the following rules:
1. If a defendant's price is above the average variable cost, the
plaintiff must prove that the price was nevertheless designed to injure
competition and realize monopoly profits. 1
4
2. If plaintiff proves that defendant's price is below average vari-
able cost, the defendant must show that its price was not designed to
injure competition.115
These rules reveal that price/cost evidence is at the heart of preda-
tion. However, evidence of subjective intent may support or defeat the
presumptions of legality established by the cost factors. Consideration of
subjective evidence avoids the dismissal of claims against defendants who
can manipulate cost and prices to meet the Areeda-Turner standard.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's test does not fall prey to the weaknesses of the
Areeda-Turner rule. The Supreme Court, however, takes a very different
approach to predatory pricing.
110. Id. at 1035-36.
111. Transamerica Computer v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983), affig, 481 F.
Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
112. Id. at 1397.
113. Id. at 1388.
114. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,




F. The U.S. Supreme Court's Approach to Predatory Pricing
The Supreme Court has not ruled decisively on what test should be
used in predatory pricing cases. However, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
cently discussed predatory pricing in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp. 6
In Matsushita, instead of setting forth a test, the Court raised the
standard of proof for summary judgment in predatory pricing cases, rea-
soning that such pricing is a rare occurrence. The Zenith Radio Corpora-
tion and the National Union Electric Corporation (NUE) sued twenty-
one corporations that manufactured or sold Japanese consumer elec-
tronic products, primarily television sets."17 Zenith and NUE claimed
that the defendants violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, section 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916 by conspiring to
drive the plaintiffs out of the American consumer electronics market.
Zenith and NUE alleged that the defendants conspired to set artificially
high prices for television sets sold by defendants in Japan and simultane-
ously set low prices for television sets sold in the United States. Accord-
ing to Zenith and NUE, the defendants began this conspiracy in 1953
and had fully implemented the scheme by the late 1960s.
After several years of extensive discovery, defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment on all claims. Pursuant to the district court's
instructions, Zenith and NUE filed a "Final Pre-trial Statement," which
contained all the documentary evidence that they planned to offer at
trial. In response, defendants challenged the admissibility of the plain-
tiffs' evidence. The district court held that the majority of the evidence
was inadmissible.118
Based upon the admissible evidence, the district court found that no
genuine issue of material fact existed to support Zenith and NUB's con-
spiracy theory. 19 The court granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants on the Sherman Act section 1 claims, and on the claims under the
Wilson Tariff Act. 2 The court dismissed the Sherman Act section 2
claims and ruled for the defendants on the Robinson-Patman Act
claims.1
2 1
116. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986).
117. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981). Zenith and NUE filed separately. In 1974 the two cases were consolidated.
118. Id at 1135-39.
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On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.122 The Third Circuit held
that much of the evidence not allowed by the district court was admissi-
ble.123 The additional evidence rendered the district court's ruling on the
summary judgment motion improper1 24 because a fact finder could rea-
sonably conclude from the evidence that a conspiracy existed to "depress
prices in the American market in order to drive out Amaerican competi-
tors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japa-
nese market."
125
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the court of appeals had used the proper standard to evaluate
the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment and to
ascertain whether the defendants could be held liable under the antitrust
laws for a conspiracy partially compelled by a foreign sovereign. 126 In a
5-4 decision, the Court reversed and remanded on the first issue but
failed to reach the second issue.
127
The Court identified the claims for which Zenith and NUE could
not recover. First, they could not recover antitrust damages based on an
alleged cartelization of the Japanese market because the Sherman Act
cannot regulate the conduct of other nations except when that conduct
has an effect on American commerce. 128 Second, Zenith and NUE could
not recover for a conspiracy to charge higher than competitive prices in
the United States because they would not suffer an antitrust injury as a
result of such a conspiracy. 129 Finally, Zenith and NUE could not re-
cover for a conspiracy to impose non-price restraints that raise market
price or limit output because such restraints would not injure the plain-
tiffs.130 The Court found that since Zenith and NUE standing alone
could not recover on the above claims, the Third Circuit incorrectly
found evidence of the alleged conspiracies to be direct evidence of a con-
spiracy to injure them.
13 1
Although evidence of the alleged conspiracies could not be used to
recover antitrust damages, Zenith and NUE argued that the evidence
122. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
123. Id at 259-303.
124. Id. at 306-09.
125. Id at 309.
126. Cert. granted, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985) (grant limited to two issues).
127. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986).
128. Id. at 582 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945)).
129. See Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977).




could be used to support the claim that the defendants conspired to mo-
nopolize the United States market by pricing below market level.132 The
court of appeals had held that if the plaintiffs could prove this allegation,
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act would result.133 Since
defendants did not dispute the appellate court's conclusion, the only is-
sue for decision became whether Zenith and NUE presented sufficiently
probative evidence to survive defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
34
The Supreme Court cited Cities Service, holding that if the entire
record "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.' ,,135 The Court stated that
under the traditional standard for summary judgment, the plaintiffs had
to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
defendants entered into an illegal conspiracy which caused the plaintiffs'
injury.'3 6 To meet this standard, Zenith and NUE had to show they
suffered injury.'3 7 Only evidence of the monopolization of the American
market could be used to satisfy this requirement because other alleged
conspiracies would not have hurt these plaintiffs.138 Embellishing upon
traditional summary judgment requirements, the Court held that the fac-
tual context of a case must be considered when determining the quantum
of proof necessary to support a plaintiff's claim.' 3 9 The Court decided
that Zenith and NUB's claim had no rational economic basis and that,
consequently, they must present more persuasive evidence than usually
necessary to support the claim."4 Only if the evidence "tends to exclude
the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently," could
plaintiffs avoid summary judgment for the defendants.' 4' To evaluate
the evidence, the Court "consider[ed] the nature of the alleged conspir-
acy and the practical obstacles to its implementation." 42
To define the "nature of the alleged conspiracy," the Court first ana-
lyzed predatory pricing on a general level. The Court expressed its doubt
that predatory pricing could exist under any circumstances and cited
132. IM at 584.
133. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 306 (3d Cir. 1983).
134. Matsushita Elea Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 585.
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commentators among whom "there is a consensus.., that predatory
pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful."' 43
The Court found that predatory pricing schemes are risky because
the predatory firm always loses profits in the short-run and any gain in
the long-run depends upon successfully driving the competition out of
the market. 1" Not only must the predatory firm achieve monopoly
power, it must maintain that power long enough to recover its losses and
earn additional profits.14
The Court doubted that such a conspiracy would ever exist within a
cartel. 14 6 In a cartel, success depends upon each firm's "willingness to
endure losses for an indefinite period." '147 This gives "each conspirator
... strong incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the losses neces-
sary to destroy the competition while sharing in any gains if the conspir-
acy succeeds."
14 8
Moreover, the Court also found evidence that the conspiracy did not
exist because the plaintiffs' shares of the retail television market 149 had
not appreciably declined in the twenty years after the alleged conspiracy
began.150 Because the defendants did not have a good chance to recoup
their losses by achieving and maintaining monopoly power, the Court
reasoned that it was very unlikely that the defendants had engaged in a
predatory pricing conspiracy."' 1
The Court, relying on Cities Service and Monsanto, found that with-
out a definite motive to conspire, the defendants' conduct did not support
an inference of conspiracy if there was another plausible explanation for
their actions. 52 Allowing courts to find conspiracies when such infer-
ences were implausible would deter competition. 3 In so holding, the
Court balanced the need to protect legitimate price competition
1 4
against the desire to punish illegal conspiracies 55 and concluded that
granting summary judgment in cases with ambiguous evidence would not
143. Id. at 589.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 590.
147. Id.
148. Id
149. Id at 591.
150. Id
151. Id at 591-92.
152. Id at 593-95; see First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253,
278-80 (1968); Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1983).
153. Matsushita Elec. Indus% Co., 475 U.S. at 593 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-64).




encourage such conspiracies.1 56 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
predatory pricing schemes are self-deterring 1" because, unlike other
schemes that violate antitrust laws, failed predatory pricing schemes are
costly to conspirators. 158
Justice White dissented in Matsushita, criticizing the majority's
opinion on several grounds. First, White argued that the majority's dis-
cussion did not conform with traditional summary judgment doctrine. 159
White stated that the majority had interpreted Monsanto to hold that
courts could not allow fact finders to find conspiracies when such an
inference would be implausible."6 In contrast, White believed that Mon-
santo really held that "a particular piece of evidence standing alone was
insufficiently probative to justify sending a case to the jury."16' By re-
quiring a judge to decide whether the inference of conspiracy is more
probable than not, he argued that the Court invaded the role of the fact
finder and overturned settled law.1
62
Second, White disagreed with the majority on the requirements for a
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'6 3 The majority required the
plaintiffs to show that the defendants had conspired to drive them out of
the relevant markets by pricing below cost. 164 This argument assumes
that any other type of agreement could not have injured the plaintiffs. 16 5
The testimony of one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, which was ex-
cluded erroneously by the district court, directly contradicted this as-
sumption.166 The expert testified that the defendants' conduct had
harmed the plaintiffs. White found this testimony alone sufficient to cre-
ate a genuine issue of fact.167 White argued that the Court invaded the
role of the fact finder by ignoring the expert's report and assuming that
the defendants favored profit-maximization over growth.' 68
Third, White agreed with the Third Circuit's disposition of the
case.1 69 The Third Circuit had found that a fact finder could reasonably
156. Id. at 595.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 599.
160. Id. at 600.
161. Id.





167. Id. at 603.
168. Id. at 604.
169. Id.
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conclude that the five-company rule was not merely a device to raise
prices.17 The majority of the Supreme Court, however, claimed that the
Third Circuit erred by treating evidence of price-fixing in Japan, the five-
company rule, and check prices as direct evidence of a conspiracy.
17 1
White stated that contrary to the Supreme Court's holding, the fact
finder could find that use of the five company rule "combined with price-
fixing in Japan, was intended to permit concentration of the effects of
dumping upon American competitors while eliminating competition
among Japanese manufacturers in either market." 17 2 Because a fact
finder could find the five-company rule was not used solely to raise
prices, a material issue of fact existed and summary judgment was, there-
fore, inappropriate.
Finally, White criticized the Court for seeming to require the Third
Circuit to "engage in academic discussion about predation."' 173 A court's
role is to decide, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, whether a fact finder could conclude that the defendants
engaged in long-term, below-cost sales. 174 White argued that since the
Third Circuit had originally taken this course, the Court should not re-
mand the case so that the lower court could repeat this process.
175
In addition to the weaknesses in the majority's decision described by
White, commentators have found Matsushita disappointing because the
Supreme Court failed to establish a test for predatory pricing and thereby
refused to resolve a split among the circuit Courts. 17 6 'he U.S. courts of
appeal are split over the importance of intent, but they all use variations
of cost analysis.'77 Instead of resolving this split of authority, the
Supreme Court raised the standard of proof for surviving a summary
judgment motion.'
78
Yet another weakness of Matsushita is the Supreme Court's assump-
tion that predatory pricing rarely occurs because it is economically un-
170. Id. at 605. The term "five-company rule" refers to a practice whereby each Japanese
producer was permitted to sell only to five American distributers. Id. at 575. Such a practice
limits distribution in the United States. Id. at 583.
171. Id at 605. The term "check prices" refers to a minimum price fixed by agreement
with the Japanese government for CEPs exported to the United States. Id. at 575.
172. In re Japanese Electrical Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 311 (3d Cir. 1983).
173. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 606 (1986).
174. Id
175. Id.
176. Brenda S. Levine, Casenote, Predatory Pricing Conspiracies After Matsushita Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: Can an Antitrust Plaintiff Survive the Supreme Court's Skepti-
cism?, 22 INT'L LAW. 529, 541 (1988).
177. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 768-69.
178. Levine, supra note 176, at 541.
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feasible. This assumption appears to underlie the Court's decision to
raise the standard for survival of a summary judgment motion.17 9
III. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY APPROACH TO
PREDATORY PRICING
A. Statutory Basis
The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, which established the Euro-
pean Economic Community, forms the basis of the prohibition of preda-
tory pricing in the EC. Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits all
agreements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition and which
have an adverse effect on trade between Member States."s For example,
a cartel agreement seeking to carry on predatory conduct against outside
manufacturers would clearly fall within this per se prohibition.13 1
Predatory pricing is also illegal under article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. The drafters intended article 86 to act as a device for maintaining
free competition in the European common market by prohibiting abusive
conduct by a dominant undertaking. 1 2 Article 86 states that predatory
pricing by a dominant firm constitutes dominant abuse.183 Subsection (a)
of article 86 defines abusive conduct as the practice of a dominant under-
taking directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions.'"
B. Akzo Chemie BV
InAkzo, "5 the EC Commission decided its first case involving pred-
atory pricing. In this case, Engineering and Chemical Supplies (Epsom
and Gloucester) Ltd. (ECS) and the United Kingdom alleged that Akzo
Chemie had violated article 86 of the Treaty of Rome by abusing its
dominant position in the EC organic peroxides market.18 6 The alleged
conduct took the form of systematic predatory and discriminatory pric-
ing by Akzo, executed through its subsidiary Akzo UK Ltd. (Akzo
179. The Supreme Court did not discuss cost/price evidence. However, the Court did cite
the consensus among commentators that predatory pricing is economically impractical. This
citation indicates the influence of economic analysis incorporated in the Areeda-Turner Model.
180. EEC TREATY art. 85(1).
181. Robert Merkin, Predatory Pricing or Competitive Pricing:. Establishing the Truth in
English and EEC Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 182, 192 (1987).
182. EEC TREATY art. 86(a).
183. Commission Decision 85/609, 1985 OJ. (L 374) 1; Merkin, supra note 181, at 192.
184. EEC TREATY art. 86(a).
185. Commission Decision 85/609, 1985 O.L (L 374) 1.
186. Id,
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UK).187 ECS complained that Akzo implemented its pricing policy in
response to ECS' expansion into the plastics sector of the organic perox-
ides market in the United Kingdom and Germany.' 88 ECS also claimed
that Akzo UK intended for its low prices to eliminate ECS as a competi-
tor in the EC organic peroxide market.'8 9
The EC Commission investigated the complaint in 1982 and issued
an interim measure decision in 1983 ordering Akzo UK to raise its prof-
its to the levels realized before it began the alleged predatory and dis-
criminatory pricing. 190
On December 14, 1985, the Commission issued its final decision on
the matter, holding that Akzo had abused its dominant position in the
EC organic peroxide market by pursuing a strategy of predatory pricing
in the United Kingdom flour additives sector.191 The Commission deter-
mined that Akzo's strategy was designed to eliminate ECS from the
larger, more lucrative plastics sector of the EC organic peroxides market
and, therefore, constituted abusive conduct prohibited by article 86.192
The Commission imposed a fine of 10 million European Currency Units
(ECU) upon Akzo, 193 describing Akzo's behavior as "of a particularly
serious nature."'
194
To determine the merits of ECS's claims, the Commission had to
answer three questions. First, did Akzo hold a dominant position as de-
fined by article 86? Second, did the alleged conduct constitute an abuse
of a dominant position? Third, was there an appreciable effect upon
trade between Member States?
195
The Commission first found that the relevant market was the or-
ganic peroxides sector of the EC as a whole. 196 The Commission found
Akzo held a dominant position because it had a fifty percent share of this
market. 1
97
Next, to determine whether an abuse of this position had occurred,
the Commission first reviewed the purpose of article 86. Article 86 is
"based primarily on Article 3(f) of the Treaty, which requires that the
187. Id. at 1-2. The U.S. equivalent of the Commission award is SI 1 million.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id
190. Id See Commission Decision 83/462, 1983 0.3. (L 252) 13.




195. Id. at 16.
196. Id. at 17.
197. Id. at 18.
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Community pursue the institution of a system of effective competi-
tion." 198 Article 86 attempts to fill the requirement that the Commission
institute a system of effective competition by prohibiting practices which
"might damage consumers or customers directly but also those which are
indirectly detrimental to them." 199
In defining the standard to be used to determine abuse, the Commis-
sion expressly avoided tests employed by courts in the United States.
The Commission stated that "[a]rticle 86 does not prescribe any cost-
based legal rule to define the precise stage at which price-cutting by a
dominant firm may become abusive and indeed the broad application of
the concept of abuse to different forms of exclusionary behavior would
argue against such a narrow test."200
The Commission rejected Akzo's defense which was based upon the
Areeda-Turner model. Akzo had argued that its prices were legal be-
cause they were above its average variable costs, which served as a proxy
for marginal costs. 20 1 The Commission identified this argument as an
application of the Areeda-Turner model and rejected it as a per se test.2
0 2
The Commission discussed the weaknesses of a per se test based on
marginal or variable costs.2"3 The Commission faulted the static and
short-term concept of "efficiency" because it does not take into account
the broad objectives of EC competition.214 The Areeda-Turner model
ignores longer term strategic considerations and the element of discrimi-
nation among different groups of customers.20 5 Thus, the Commission
concluded that a firm need not price below average variable costs to
achieve anti-competitive results.2' 6
The Commission emphasized that intent is a very important element
of predatory pricing:20 7
There may be circumstances where the exclusionary consequences of a
price cutting campaign by a dominant producer are so self-evident that
no evidence of intention to eliminate a competitor is necessary. On the








206. Id The Commission did acknowledge that analysis of the aggressor's costs may be
important in establishing the reasonableness of the pricing conduct and in determining the
underlying purpose. Id at 20-21.
207. Id
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other hand, where low pricing could be susceptible of several explana-
tions, evidence of an intention to eliminate a competitor or restrict
competition might also be required to prove an infringement. Such
evidence may exist in the form of internal documentation of the domi-
nant company pointing to a scheme to damage competitors. In the
absence however of direct documentary evidence an exclusionary in-
tention might be inferred from all the circumstances of the case.
20 8
In sum, the Commission looked at pricing conduct which is based
on the Areeda-Turner model, but also reviewed evidence of intent, which
is not considered in the Areeda-Turner model. The Commission found
adequate evidence of Akzo's predatory intent. To support this finding,
the Commission cited documentary evidence of a detailed plan by Akzo
to eliminate ECS as a competitor, the selective nature of the price cuts to
regular customers of ECS, Akzo UK's departure from its previous pat-
tern of full cost recovery in flour additives, and the subsidizing of loss in
the flour additives sector by transfer of profits from the plastics and elas-
tomers division.20 9
The Commission also cited numerous instances of Akzo's behavior,
which proved that Akzo had abused its dominant position. For example,
Akzo had made direct threats, offered products to customers of ECS at
unreasonably low prices, offered potassium bromate and vitamin mix at
bait prices to ECS's customers, obtained price quotes of other suppliers
from customers and offered prices just below competing quotations.
210
Finally, the Commission found that the strategic objective of elimi-
nating ECS as a competitor constituted an abuse of a dominant position
in the market and had a direct causal link to trade between Member
States.211
The rationale for the Akzo decision demonstrates that the EC and
the United States perceive competition differently. In Akzo, the Commis-
sion rejected allocative efficiency as the sole objective of competition.212
The Commission focused upon the defendant's discriminatory practices.
In particular, the Commission criticized Akzo's attempt to recover full
costs from its regular customers while tempting its rival's customers with
lower prices. The Commission considers cost relevant in determining
predatory pricing, but focuses upon the dominant firm's intent.
The Akzo decision has been criticized for failing to set forth objec-
208. Id
209. Id at 21.
210. Id at 21-22.
211. Id. at 23.
212. Id. at 20.
[Vol. 15
Predatory Pricing
tive criteria for defining predatory pricing.2 13 Unlike the Areeda-Turner
model, the test does not establish a purely objective standard for identifi-
cation of predatory pricing. Rather, the Commission incorporates the
subjective criteria of intent. Therefore, resolution of each case depends
on a weighing of evidence which suggests or refutes predatory intent.
2t4
To determine whether predatory pricing exists, the Commission will
review a variety of evidence of predatory intent. The Commission
thereby recognizes that economic models do not prohibit many strategic
forms of predation.215 The Commission refuses to limit its analysis to
evidence of costs and prices because it is concerned with objectives other
than allocative efficiency, such as fairness and impact on potential and
actual firms. Following this rule of reason approach allows the Commis-
sion to take a broader look at all the implications of a predatory pricing
scheme.
IV. COMPARISON OF STANDARDS FOR PREDATORY
PRICING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Commentators have observed that U.S. and the EC courts will come
to different conclusions when given similar facts in a predatory pricing
case.216 Several factors explain this difference in outcome.
A. Statutory Differences
The EC has specific prohibitions against predatory pricing whereas
the United States statutes under which predatory pricing claims are
brought consist of broad language which lends them to different interpre-
tations at different times.217 Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome expressly
forbids abuse of a dominant position such as unfair pricing."' 8 Section 2
of the Sherman Act merely prohibits monopolization and any attempts
to monopolize.2 19 The Sherman Act's broad language gives the U.S.
213. Ehr, supra note 4, at 289-90.
214. The Commission has also demonstrated a willingness to consider both short.term and
long-term purposes of predatory pricing. Commission Decision 85/609, 1985 OJ. (L 374) 1,
20-22.
215. Id
216. Barry E. Hawk, Antitrust Developments 1987-88: The Proposed Revisions to the Justice
Department's Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations and Recent Developments in
EEC Competition Law, 57 ANTrrusT LJ. 299, 306 (1988).
217. Id at 307.
218. EEC TREATY art. 86.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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courts considerable room to limit the conduct they will consider illegal
under section 2.
Procedural differences also exist. The statutory framework in the
EC does not provide for private actions; parties must rely on the Com-
mission to pursue their claims.220 In the United States, private parties
have an incentive to bring actions because of the prospect of treble dam-
ages and attorney fees if they are successful.221
B. Public Policy and Social Values
Another reason for the differing approaches to predatory pricing is
divergent views about competition and the goals that public policy
should serve. The concept of competition in the EC encompasses polit-
ical and social values, such as fairness, which are virtually excluded from
antitrust analysis in the United States.222 Moreover, the EC rejects allo-
cative efficiency as the exclusive objective of competition policy. Distri-
butional concerns, such as the transfer of income from consumers to
producers, are included as well as consumer welfare. 23 Also reflected in
the EC competition policy is a concern for "individual traders, fairness in
the marketplace, equality of opportunity for all commercial operators,
and the legitimate interests of workers, users, and consumers. ' ' 224 These
policy objectives are reflected in the prohibition in article 86 against
dominant firm behavior that unfairly exploits other traders.225 The focus
upon allocative efficiency in the U.S. forecloses explicit incorporation of
these concerns.
V. PROPOSAL
The use of allocative efficiency as the standard for deciding preda-
tory pricing cases in the U.S. is not sensitive to many aspects of preda-
tory pricing. The reliance of U.S. courts on the Areeda-Turner model
precludes the detection of strategic behavior such as predation through
reputation, which has strong anti-competitive effects upon actual and po-
tential market participants.22 6 Recognizing the deficiencies of the cost
analysis approach would allow the courts to consider more types of evi-
dence in deciding predatory pricing cases.
220. Hawk, supra note 216, at 308.
221. Id.
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Three possible approaches exist which would remedy the deficien-
cies of the Areeda-Turner model by including evidence of intent. First,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Inglis"7 and Transamerica Com-
puter 28 has articulated a test which incorporates both cost and intent
analysis and allocates the burdens of proof in presenting evidence at trial.
If a defendant's price is above the average variable cost, the plaintiff must
prove that the price was nevertheless designed to injure the competition
and produce monopoly profits.2 9 If the plaintiff proves that the defend-
ant's price is below average variable cost, the defendant must show that
its price was not designed to injure competition. 2  The plaintiff can in-
troduce evidence of intent, market power, market structure, and long-run
behavior that influenced pricing decisions to prove that a price which is
above average variable cost caused injury.3 While this model does not
resolve all the theoretical problems inherent in the Areeda-Turner model,
it does allow a plaintiff who cannot show injury under the Areeda-Turner
model to survive a summary judgment motion.
Second, Professor Joseph Brodley of Boston University and Profes-
sor George Hay of Cornell University suggest a different approach,
which would allow a plaintiff with a meritorious claim to avoid a sum-
mary judgment motion. Brodley and Hay advocate a two-step ap-
proach. 2 The first step is to determine whether various economic
tests 3 indicate uniformly or overwhelmingly the existence of predatory
pricing or whether one economic test emerges as factually most appropri-
ate." If the first step does not reveal a clear result, the courts could
then undertake a second step by evaluating the pricing conduct under a
more extensive balancing approach."3 The second step analysis involves
balancing the anticompetitive and output-restrictive consequences of the
alleged predatory conduct against the potential competitive and output-
increasing effects generated by the challenged activity.3 6 Such an ap-
proach is required to avoid the dangers of blindly adhering to a single
227. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. rIT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014
(9th Cir. 1981).
228. See Transamerica Computer v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
229. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., 668 F.2d at 1035-36.
230. Id. at 1036.
231. Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1391.
232. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 791-92.
233. These tests include the Areeda-Turner model, the Posner rule, the goskow-Klevorick
rule, the Boumol rule and the Scherer rule. Id at 774-79.
234. Id. at 791.
235. Id at 791-92.
236. Id at 792.
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economic model which lacks empirical validity and does not include pol-
icy considerations.
Third, the Akzo 237 decision also reflects an awareness that relying
solely upon a single economic model could be misleading. This aware-
ness led the EC Commission to review evidence of intent and behavior to
determine abuse of a dominant position. The Commission may pursue
other policy goals, such as fairness and impact on potential and existing
firms. Incorporation of the Akzo approach reveals different types of
predatory behavior which are not detectable under the Areeda-Turner
model.
If the Supreme Court had adopted any one of the three approaches
discussed above to decide Matsushita, it is clear that plaintiffs in that case
would have survived a summary judgment motion by introducing evi-
dence of a long-term scheme to facilitate predatory pricing. All three
approaches take a broad view of the types of evidence which can be used
to demonstrate predatory pricing. Given the fact that no plaintiff has
prevailed under the Areeda-Turner model,238 changes incorporating an
expansive view of relevant evidence of all facets of predatory behavior are
necessary to insure that predatory pricing remains a viable claim. In-
stead of using a strict economic standard which holds many undesirable
pricing practices per se legal, a broad rule of reason approach is needed
to allow consideration of all the dangers of predatory pricing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1975 the federal courts in the United States have viewed eco-
nomic efficiency as the primary goal of companies. 39 Based on this
value judgment, the courts have examined narrowly the behavior of firms
to determine whether predatory pricing has occurred. They have relied
upon the Areeda-Turner economic model which uses average price as the
legitimate floor for pricing. The Supreme Court, influenced by the adop-
tion of this model by the lower courts and by the endorsement of this
model by commentators, 2' raised the standard for a plaintiff to survive a
summary judgment motion.241 The Supreme Court has not recognized
the fact that predatory pricing is rarely proven because economic tests do
not detect all predatory conduct.
The Areeda-Turner model, which has widely influenced federal
237. Commission Decision 85/609, 1985 O.J. (L 374) 1.
238. Brodley & Hay, supra note 18, at 768. See also Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1077-94.
239. Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1053.




courts, is not completely accurate. 2 2 Even if it did correctly reflect the
cost and pricing behavior of a firm, it is limited to a static portrayal of a
firm's short-run behavior. Furthermore, it allows dominant firms to
achieve strategic goals of predation by deterring other firms through its
reputation and signaling prices and levels of output. A firm might not be
pricing below average variable cost, but it may still be achieving strategic
anti-competitive effects.
The approach taken by the European Economic Commission takes
into account the weaknesses of the Areeda-Turner model. The Commis-
sion closely examines all evidence demonstrating predatory intent.
243
The Commission rejects economic orthodoxy and holds that strategic be-
havior through predation is dangerous to competition. InAkzo the Com-
mission demonstrates a concern with policing a dominant firm to detect
any anti-competitive behavior. Thus, the Commission has made preda-
tory pricing a viable claim. The Commission's broad view of policing
behavior demonstrates a commitment to encouraging competition which
is not evident in the Supreme Court's narrow review of firms' efficiency.
The United States has much to learn from the EC's treatment of
predatory pricing. Specifically, U.S. courts should recognize the weak-
nesses of the economic model which they often adopt uncritically. They
should also recognize that predatory pricing involves more than ineffi-
ciency. If the Supreme Court ignores these points and continues to fol-
low Matsushita, it will cripple judicial review on the merits and thereby
ignore many forms of predation.
242. See Brodley & Hay, supra note 18.
243. Commission Decision 85/609, 1985 O. (L 374) 1, 20-22.
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